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Does Raising the Retirement Age  
Increase Employment of Older Workers?
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This paper studies how an increase in the minimum retirement age affects the labor market 
behavior of older workers. Between 2000 and 2006 the Austrian government gradually 
increased the early retirement age from 60 to 62.2 for men and from 55 to 57.2 for women. 
Using administrative data on the universe of Austrian private-sector employees, the results 
from the empirical analysis suggest that this policy change reduced retirement by 19 
percentage points among affected men and by 25 percentage points among affected women. 
The decline in retirement was accompanied by a sizeable increase in employment of 7 
percentage points among men and 10 percentage points among women, but had also 
important spillover effects into the unemployment insurance program. Specifically, the 
unemployment rate increased by 10 percentage points among men and 11 percentage points 
among women. In contrast, the policy change had only a small impact on the share of 
individuals claiming disability or partial retirement benefits. 
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Between 1970 and 2010 the average life expectancy at age 65 in OECD countries
increased by roughly 4 years for men and 5 years for women. Over the same
period the average retirement age has declined by almost one year. Forecast
suggest that there will be a further increase in life expectancy of around 3 years
between 2010 and 2050 (OECD, 2011). These trends raise concerns about the
ﬁnancial stability of public pension systems because individuals tend to claim
retirement beneﬁts longer and the ratio of workers to pensioners is expected to
rise. The OECD projects that these forces will increase pension expenditures
from 9.2 percent of GDP in 2007 to 12.7 percent of GDP in 2060 (OECD, 2011).
To reduce the ﬁnancial pressure on public pension systems, many countries have
cut retirement beneﬁts or increased the retirement age.1 To evaluate the cost
and beneﬁts of these policy measures, it is critical to estimate how labor supply
at older ages responds to changes in the program rules.
There is an extensive literature on how changes in beneﬁt generosity aﬀect
the timing of retirement (Burtless, 1986; Krueger and Pischke, 1992; Samwick,
1998; Coile and Gruber, 2007; Liebman et al., 2009; Manoli and Weber, 2010).
Those studies typically ﬁnd that changes in retirement beneﬁts have a signiﬁcant
impact on the timing of retirement. In contrast, there is little work on how
a rise in the retirement age aﬀects labor force participation. Most countries
distinguish between an early retirement age (ERA) and a normal retirement
age (NRA). While individuals can claim retirement beneﬁts at a reduced rate
upon reaching the ERA, they will only qualify for full retirement beneﬁts at the
NRA. This paper investigates how an increase in the ERA aﬀects the labor force
participation of older workers by exploiting two policy changes in the Austrian
pension system that increased the ERA for men and women by more than 2
years between 2000 and 2006.
1For a summary of the reforms implemented in the 1990s see Schwarz and Demirguc-Kunt
(1999). More recent reforms in industrialized countries are discussed in Gruber and Wise
(2007).
2The ﬁrst objective of this paper is to determine how a rise in the ERA aﬀects
employment and retirement behavior. A series of studies that investigate the
relationship between social security provisions and retirement have documented
a sharp increase in retirement rates at the age of ﬁrst eligibility for retirement
beneﬁts (Gruber and Wise, 2007). Judging from this empirical regularity, an
increase in the ERA is likely to be an eﬀective measure to delay retirement. At
the same time, the employment response may be weak if individuals respond to
a rise in the ERA by seeking beneﬁts from other social insurance programs. A
second key question is therefore whether an increase in the ERA leads to more
enrollment in other social insurance programs that may be used as a gateway
to early retirement. Understanding how a rise in the ERA aﬀects inﬂow into
other programs is also important to assess the consequences for government
expenditures.
The Austrian labor market is characterized by an extremely low labor force
participation of older workers aged 55-64. In 2009 only 42 percent of individuals
in this age group were employed or looking for a job compared to an average of 57
percent in the OECD countries. The low labor force participation rate of older
individuals in Austria is due mainly to the low ERA compared to other countries
and the availability of alternative pathways into early retirement. Prior to 2000,
men could claim retirement beneﬁts already at age 60 and women at age 55, con-
ditional on having contributed a certain number of years to the public pension
system. Approximately 30 percent of working men and women exit the labor
market at these ages. However, because eligibility criteria for disability beneﬁts
are relaxed starting at age 57, a large fraction of men withdraws from the labor
market already before the ERA through the disability insurance program. The
unemployment insurance is another important pathway into early retirement
in Austria, because older unemployed can claim unemployment beneﬁts longer
than younger unemployed.
In an eﬀort to foster employment among older individuals, the Austrian
3government implemented a series of changes in 2000 and 2004, which reduced
the generosity of and accessibility to retirement beneﬁts. The most important
element of these policy changes was an increase in the ERA by 26 months
between 2000 and 2006, which is the period covered by our data. Because the
increase was phased in gradually, month-of-birth is the key determinant for
the age of ﬁrst eligibility for retirement beneﬁts. We can therefore estimate
the eﬀects of these policy changes by comparing the labor market behavior of
younger birth cohorts to older birth cohorts who were not aﬀected by the rise
in the ERA. The change in the ERA did not apply to men and women with a
long work history who could still claim retirement beneﬁts at age 60 and 55,
respectively. We use this rule to evaluate the robustness of our main results
by comparing the labor market behavior of people with low work experience to
those with high work experience.
Using administrative data from all private sector workers in Austria, the
empirical analysis suggests that these policy changes reduced the claiming of
retirement beneﬁts by 19 percentage points among aﬀected men and by 25 per-
centage points among aﬀected women. The drop in retirement beneﬁt claiming
was accompanied by a lasting increase in employment of 7 percentage points
among men and 10 percentage points among women. The total eﬀect on em-
ployment was even larger, since the rise in the ERA increased enrollment into
the partial retirement scheme by 0.5 percentage points among men and 1.8 per-
centage points among women. However, the estimates also indicate that the
increase in the ERA led to a substantial increase in registered unemployment
of 10 percentage points among men and 11 percentage points among women.
Similarly, there was a rise in the probability of receiving disability beneﬁts and
a rise in the probability of being out of the labor force, although the estimated
eﬀects are small in magnitude.
Earlier studies have relied on out-of-sample predictions to estimate the labor
supply response to changes in the ERA and NRA and typically ﬁnd that a raise
4in the retirement age leads to a sizeable increase in labor force participation
of older workers (Rust and Phelan, 1997; Panis et al., 2002; Gruber and Wise,
2004). More recently, Mastrobuoni (2009) exploits a policy change in the U.S.
that increased the NRA from 65 to 67 and raised the penalty for claiming
retirement beneﬁts before the NRA. He concludes that an increase in the NRA
by 2 months delays eﬀective retirement by around 1 month. This estimates
is much larger than the eﬀect suggested by the previous simulation studies,
possibly because the out-of-sample projections omit factors that are important
for the timing of retirement such as social custom or liquidity constraints.
Our paper estimates the labor supply response of an increase in the ERA
as opposed to the NRA. This distinction is important for two reasons. First,
an increase in the ERA forces individuals to claim retirement beneﬁts later (or
seek beneﬁts from other sources) while an increase in the NRA is equivalent to
a reduction in beneﬁts. Second, the documented peak in the age distribution
at retirement is typically more pronounced at the ERA as opposed to the NRA
(Gruber and Wise, 1999). Therefore, a rise in the ERA is likely to be a more
eﬀective measure to increase labor force participation among older workers as
opposed to a rise in the NRA.
This paper also builds on a growing literature that explores how changes
in the generosity of one social insurance program aﬀects enrollment in other
programs. Most of these studies focus on spillover eﬀects of changes in the dis-
ability insurance (Autor and Duggan, 2003; Karlström et al., 2008; Borghans
et al., 2010; Staubli, 2011) or unemployment insurance (Bloemen et al., 2011;
Inderbitzin et al., 2011). The most closely related paper is Duggan et al. (2007)
who study the same policy change as Mastrobuoni (2009) and ﬁnd that the
increased penalty for claiming retirement beneﬁts before the NRA led to more
disability insurance enrollment prior to the NRA. Our ﬁndings suggest that the
increase in the ERA had a relatively small eﬀect on disability recipiency. Instead
we ﬁnd that a signiﬁcant fraction of aﬀected individuals responded to the in-
5crease in the ERA by claiming unemployment beneﬁts or staying in employment
longer.
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes Austria’s social insur-
ance programs and the policy changes in the public pension system. Section 3
summarizes the data and presents descriptive statistics. Section 4 outlines the
empirical strategy. Section 5 presents the results. Section 6 draws conclusions.
2 Background
2.1 The Public Pension System in Austria
The Austrian pension system covers almost all workers in Austria and provides
retirement and disability beneﬁts. All beneﬁts are subject to income taxation
and mandatory health insurance contributions. Public retirement beneﬁts are
the main source of retirement income and replace on average 80 percent of the
most recent gross wage up to maximum of approximately 2,900 euros per month.
Conditional on having 35 contribution years or 37.5 insurance years, retirement
beneﬁts can be claimed at any age after the ERA of 60 for men and 55 for women,
though at a reduced rate. Insurance years comprise both contributing years
(periods of employment, including sickness, and maternity leave) and qualifying
years (periods of unemployment, military service, or secondary education). Full
retirement beneﬁts can be claimed at the NRA of 65 for men and 60 for women
as long as the individual has 15 insurance years in the last 30 years or 15
contribution years.
The level of retirement beneﬁts depends on the assessment basis and the
pension coeﬃcient. The assessment basis corresponds to the average earnings
over the best 15 years after applying a cap to earnings in each year. The
pension coeﬃcient is the percentage of the assessment basis that is received in
the pension. The pension coeﬃcient increases with the number of insurance
years up to a maximum of 80 percent (roughly 45 insurance years). Since
61996 there is a penalty for claiming beneﬁts before the NRA and a bonus for
retirement after the statutory retirement age of approximately 2 percentage
points per year.
To be eligible for disability beneﬁts, applicants must suﬀer a health impair-
ment that will last for at least 6 months and must have accumulated at least 5
insurance years. Because medical criteria for disability classiﬁcation are relaxed
starting at age 57, the disability insurance has played an important role in early
retirement (Staubli, 2011). More speciﬁcally, below that age threshold, an in-
dividual is generally considered disabled if the capacity to work is reduced by
more than 50 percent in any occupation in the economy. Above the age thresh-
old of 57 the same individual qualiﬁes for beneﬁts if the work capacity is reduced
by 50 percent in the same occupation. Because men ﬁrst become eligible for
retirement beneﬁts at age 60 as opposed to 55 for women, disability enrollment
is disproportionately high among older men. In 2008, for example, 61 percent of
new male recipients and 31 percent of new female recipients were older than 55.
The calculation of disability beneﬁts is identical to that of retirement beneﬁts,
except for a special increment that is granted to applicants below age 57.
In January 2000 the Austrian government introduced a partial retirement
scheme, allowing for a gradual transition from work to retirement. Conditional
on having worked for 15 years in the past 25 years, male workers older than 55
and female workers older than 50 can reduce their working time to 40-60 percent
of their previous work hours for a maximum period of ﬁve years while their
earnings are only reduced to 70-80 percent. The scheme is popular as a pathway
into early retirement because of the great deal of ﬂexibility in scheduling work
hours. In particular, workers are allowed to block their work hours within the
agreed period. For example, a male worker who agreed to reduce his work
hours by 50 percent can choose to work full time during the ﬁrst 2.5 years of
the program and eﬀectively retire at age 57.5.
Unemployment beneﬁts are not taxed and replace around 55 percent of the
7last net wage. Depending on the previous work history, unemployment bene-
ﬁts can be claimed for up to one year. Individuals who exhaust their regular
unemployment beneﬁts may apply for unemployment assistance. These means-
tested transfers last for successive periods of 39 weeks after which eligibility
requirement are recurrently checked and can be at most 92 percent of regular
unemployment beneﬁts. Unemployment insurance is an important pathway into
early retirement in Austria. Many older workers continue to stop working before
the ERA and bridge the gap to the ERA via unemployment insurance beneﬁts.
2.2 The 2000 and 2004 Pension Reforms
In Austria, like in other industrialized countries, the ERA has an important
eﬀect on the labor force participation decision of older workers. As Figure 1
illustrates, in 2000 the percentage of men and women working drops by around
30 percentage points at the ERA (60 for men and 55 for women) and then
gradually declines up to the NRA (65 for men and 60 for women). Figure 1
also shows that in 2006 employment rates after the ERA are signiﬁcantly higher
compared to 2000. For example, employment among 60 year old men and 55
year old women increased by around 15 percentage points. These increases
resulted from two reforms of the Austrian Pension System in 2000 and 2004
that delayed the labor market exit of elderly workers by increasing the ERA.
Figure 1
To improve the ﬁscal health of the public pension system, the Austrian
government enacted the 2000 pension reform on October 1st 2000. The reform
was debated in Parliament in June 2000 and approved at the beginning of July.
The most important change was an increase in the ERA by 1.5 years for men and
women. This increase was phased-in gradually over time. More speciﬁcally, each
quarter of birth the ERA was raised by 2 months for men born after September
1940 and women born after September 1945 until reaching 61.5 for men born
8after September 1942 and 56.5 for women born after September 1947. Men with
at least 45 contribution years and women with at least 40 contribution years
were unaﬀected by the increase in the ERA.
Along with this change, the Austrian government temporarily extended the
maximum duration of unemployment beneﬁts from 1 to 1.5 years. The extension
of unemployment beneﬁt was limited to a small group of people. Only men
born between 1940 and 1942 and women born between 1945 and 1947 who had
worked at least 15 years in the past 25 years and were unemployed in July 2000
or became unemployed after July 2000 were eligible. The beneﬁt extension was
in eﬀect until December 2002.
The reform also increased the penalties for early retirement (before the NRA)
and the bonus for retirement after the NRA. Speciﬁcally, before the reform each
year of retirement prior to the NRA reduced the pension coeﬃcient by 2 percent-
age points. After the reform this number was increased to 3 percentage points.
The 2000 reform also extended the maximal duration of the partial retirement
scheme from 5 to 6.5 years. This increase allowed for a smooth transition from
partial retirement to regular retirement while leaving the minimum age to enter
the partial retirement scheme unchanged at 55 for men and 50 for women. In
June 2003 the Austrian government enacted the 2004 pension reform, which
became eﬀective on January 1, 2004. The reform continued the increase in the
ERA from 61.5 to 65 for men and from 56.5 to 60 for women. This increase
was phased in gradually and occurred in two main stages. Each quarter of birth
the ERA increased by two months for men born between January and June
1943 and women born between January and June 1948, followed by one-month
increments per quarter of birth for men born between July 1943 and December
1952 and women born between July 1948 and December 1957. As for the 2000
pension reform, men with at least 45 contribution years and women with at
least 40 contribution years were unaﬀected by the increase in the ERA.
9The reform also reduced the generosity of retirement beneﬁts by lowering
the pension coeﬃcient and increasing the penalty for retirement prior to the
NRA. Speciﬁcally, before the reform each insurance year replaced 2 percent of
the assessment basis. After the reform this number was lowered to 1.88 percent.
Moreover, the reform changed the assessment basis from the best 15 years to
the best 40 years. This extension is being phased-in between 2004 and 2028 and
will decrease pension beneﬁts, because wages tend to increase in age. Unlike
the 2000 pension reform, there was no temporary extension of unemployment
beneﬁts.
Figure 2 summarizes the changes in the ERA for men born in January 1940
to June 1944 (left Panel) and for women born in January 1945 to June 1949
(right Panel). For these birth cohorts the ERA was increased between 2000 and
2006, which is the time period covered by our data. Over this time period the
ERA was raised by a total of 26 months (2.17 years). For older birth cohorts the
ERA was increased in two-month increments, followed by one-month increments
for younger birth cohorts, i.e. men born after June 1943 and women born after
June 1948.
Figure 2
The consequences of the increase in the ERA are seen in Figure 3, which plots
the share of men aged 60-62.17 and women aged 55-57.17 claiming retirement
beneﬁts. As Figure 3 illustrates, in the years before the 2000 reform became
eﬀective approximately 40 percent of men and 50 percent of women claimed
retirement beneﬁts. The fraction is higher among women because many men
already withdraw from the labor market before age 60 by applying for disability
beneﬁts. After 2000 the fraction of retired men aged 60-62.17 decreases by
almost 15 percentage points. Similarly, there is a 25 percentage points decline
in the share of 55-57.17 year old women in retirement. The ﬁgure also illustrates
that a large share of individuals were unaﬀected by the increase in the ERA
10because they had accumulated enough contribution years. At the end of 2006,
roughly 23 percent of men aged 60-62.17 still claimed retirement beneﬁts, even
though the ERA was 62.17. The share is smaller among women, because women
tend to have less contribution years on average.
Figure 3
3 Data
To examine the impact of the increase in the ERA on labor market behavior,
we use data from the Austrian Social Security Database (ASSD), which is de-
scribed in Zweimüller et al. (2009). The data contain very detailed longitudinal
information dating back to 1972 for all private sector workers in Austria. For
all individuals who have retired by the end of 2006, information on insurance
relevant states is available for the years prior to 1972. At the individual level the
data include gender, nationality, month and year of birth, blue-collar or white-
collar status, labor market history, earnings and individual identiﬁers. The data
contain several ﬁrm-speciﬁc variables: geographical location, industry aﬃliation
and ﬁrm identiﬁers (from 1972) that allow us to link both individuals and ﬁrms.
Our main sample consists of all men aged 60-62.25 and women aged 55-57.25
over the period 1997 to 2006 (men born in September 1937 to September 1946
and women born in September 1942 to September 1951). Given the introduction
of the partial retirement scheme in January 2000 with the potential to aﬀect
labor market behavior, the analysis focuses primarily on the years 2000 to 2006.
The sample restrictions are as follows. From the initial sample of 299,583 men
and 278,829 women we exclude 24,127 men and 12,704 women who spent more
than one year as civil servants, as they are covered by a separate pension system
with diﬀerent eligibility rules. For the same reason we exclude 52,199 men and
37,008 women who spent more than one year in self-employment. The ﬁnal
sample thus comprises 223,257 men and 229,117 women.
11Individuals are observed on the 1st of January, 1st of April, 1st of July, and
1st of October in each year. Due to the phase-in of the 2000 and 2004 policy
changes, the age at which someone can claim retirement beneﬁts is a function
of the month and year of birth. Since this information is contained in the
data, we can determine exactly who is eligible for retirement beneﬁts in a given
quarter. The earliest start date for retirement beneﬁts is the ﬁrst of the month
after reaching the ERA. For example, individuals who start claiming retirement
beneﬁts on October 1, 2000, have reached the ERA in September 2000 or earlier.
Tables 1 presents summary statistics by year for men aged 60-62.25 and
women aged 55-57.25. As shown in Panel A, from 2000 to 2006 there have
been dramatic changes in the fraction of men and women in diﬀerent labor
market states. Over this time period the share of individuals claiming retirement
beneﬁts decreased from 40.1 to 25.3 percent among men and from 48 to 15
percent among women. This decline was accompanied by a signiﬁcant rise in
employment from 7 to 17 percent among men and from 29 to 48 percent among
women. There is also an increase in partial retirement of around 5 percentage
points among men and 7 percentage points among women. However, there is
also evidence that the rise in the ERA increased registered unemployment. From
2000 to 2006 the unemployment rate rose by roughly 7 percentage points for
both men and women. Similarly, there is 2-2.5 percentage points increase in
the share of individuals who are not in the labor force. Over the same period
disability enrollment declined, perhaps reﬂecting the fact that the 2000 and 2004
policy reforms reduced the generosity of disability and retirement beneﬁts.
Panel B shows the characteristics of our sample in diﬀerent years. Both for
men and women there are only minor diﬀerences in observable characteristics
between diﬀerent years. Women are less likely to work in blue-collar occupations
and tend to have more sick leave days than men. They also tend to have less
work experience and less insurance years than their male counterparts. These
diﬀerences largely arise because women in our sample are on average ﬁve years
12younger than men. Finally, the last two rows of Panel B show that annual




The goal of the 2000 and 2004 reforms was to foster employment among older
workers by increasing the ERA. While access to retirement beneﬁts became
stricter as a result of this increase, eligibility criteria for unemployment, partial
retirement, and disability beneﬁts remained the same. Therefore, it is plausible
that some individuals who would have otherwise claimed retirement beneﬁts
responded to this change by seeking beneﬁts from other social insurance pro-
grams. Such a change in behavior would diminish the positive eﬀect of these
reforms on employment.
Because the increase in retirement age was phased-in gradually, the age at
which an individual could claim retirement beneﬁts depended on the month
of birth. For example, men born before October 1940 could claim beneﬁts at
age 60 while those born in October to December 1940 had to wait 2 months
longer before they became eligible for beneﬁts. As illustrated in Figure 2, there
are similar discontinuities in the ERA for other birth cohorts and for women.
On this basis, the primary approach to estimate the eﬀect of the rise in the
retirement age compares the labor market behavior of younger birth cohorts to
older birth cohorts who were not aﬀected by the increase in the ERA.
This comparison can be implemented by estimating regressions of the fol-
lowing type:
yit =  + i + t + X0
it +  Belowit + "it (1)
where i denotes individual, t quarter, and yit is the outcome variable of interest;
i are age ﬁxed eﬀects (where age is measured in months) to control for age-
13speciﬁc trends in labor market behavior; t is a set of time ﬁxed eﬀects to capture
common time shocks in labor market behavior; and Xit represents individual or
region speciﬁc characteristics to control for any observable diﬀerences that might
confound the analysis (blue-collar status, experience, insurance years, sick days,
previous annual earnings, average earnings over the best 15 years, industry
dummies, region dummies, and a fourth-order polynomial in birth-month to
control for cohort-varying outcome characteristics).
The key explanatory variable is Below, which is equal to one if an indi-
vidual’s age in quarter t is below the ERA, and zero otherwise. For example,
because the ﬁrst increase in the ERA occurred in the forth quarter of 2000,
Below is zero for all individuals on January 1, April 1, July 1, and October 1,
2000. On January 1, 2001, Below is one for men below age 60.17 born in Octo-
ber to December 1940 and women below age 55.17 born October to December
1945, because for these birth cohorts the ERA was increased by 2 months in the
forth quarter of 2000.
The identifying assumption is that, absent the increase in the ERA, the
change in yit would have been comparable between age groups not yet eligible
for retirement beneﬁts (treatment group) and those eligible (comparison group)
after controlling for background characteristics. Under this assumption,  mea-
sures the average causal eﬀect of an increase in the ERA on yit, using variation
over time. Equation (1) is estimated separately for men aged 60-62.25 and
women aged 55-57.25 using data for the period 2000 to 2006. The advantage
of focusing on a small age range is that individuals who are not aﬀected by
the increase in the retirement age are close substitutes to those aﬀected. Thus,
trends in labor market behavior across age groups are likely to be similar. As
a placebo check, we estimate equation (1) for the subsample of men with more
than 45 contribution years and women with more than 40 contribution years.
Because these individuals were not aﬀected by the increase in the ERA,  should
be zero.
14Both the 2000 and 2004 pension reforms implemented other changes to the
pension system, in addition to the increase in the ERA. A potential concern of
our empirical strategy is that theses changes had a diﬀerential impact on the
labor market behavior in the treatment and comparison groups. Both the 2000
and 2004 pension reforms raised the penalty for claiming retirement beneﬁts
before the NRA. The reduction in the pension coeﬃcient was relatively modest
and is unlikely to have aﬀected retirement behavior in the treatment and com-
parison groups diﬀerently. For example, the 2000 pension reform reduced the
retirement beneﬁts of a 62 year old men by 3 percentage points. The penalty
implemented with the 2004 reform was even smaller.
To investigate the impact of the reduction in beneﬁt generosity, we perform
two robustness tests. First, we re-estimate equation (1) with age-speciﬁc time
trends, to allow treatment and comparison age groups to follow diﬀerent trends.
Second, we estimate a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence regression using men with more
than 45 contribution years and women with more than 40 contribution years as
comparison groups. This approach allows us to isolate the eﬀect of the increase
in the ERA, because the penalty for claiming retirement beneﬁts before the
NRA depended only on age but not on work experience. Because individuals
with little work experience may diﬀer in observable and unobservable ways from
those with ample work experience, we restrict the sample to individuals with
at least 35 contribution years. Moreover, we focus only on men aged 60-61.5
and women aged 55-56.5 who were aﬀected by an increase in the ERA between
January 2001 and May 2004. This restriction allows us to observe aﬀected
individuals for at least 2.5 years after the increase in the ERA took eﬀect.
This diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence comparison is implemented using the following
speciﬁcation:




l (dl  Littleit) + "it (2)
15where Little is a dummy that is equal to 1 if an individual has too little contri-
bution years to be exempted from the increase in the ERA and dl is a dummy
that is 1 in year l and 0 otherwise. Each coeﬃcient l measures the diﬀerence in
the outcome variable of interest in year l between the treatment group and the
comparison group relative to the baseline year (2000). The pre-reform interac-
tion terms provide pretreatment speciﬁcation tests, although they may capture
possible anticipation eﬀects. The post-reform interaction terms allow for an
examination of the long running eﬀects of this policy change.
The 2000 pension reform also temporarily extended the unemployment ben-
eﬁt duration from 1 to 1.5 years for certain birth cohorts. This extension is
unlikely to exert an eﬀect on retirement beneﬁt claiming, but it may aﬀect the
employment response. In particular, eligible individuals could be more inclined
to respond to the increase in the ERA by seeking unemployment beneﬁts instead
of remaining in employment. We will explore the impact of the unemployment
beneﬁt extension in three ways. First, since the beneﬁt extension was only in
eﬀect until the end of 2002, we estimate equation (1) separately for the period
when the extension was in eﬀect and after it was abolished. Second, men with
more than 45 contribution years and women with more than 40 contribution
years were also eligible for the beneﬁt extension, but they could still claim re-
tirement beneﬁts at the pre-reform ERA. Hence, the estimates of equation (2)
capture the isolated impact of the increase in the ERA. Third, men born in
1942 were eligible for the beneﬁt extension in 2002 while men born in 1943
were not. This rule allows us to examine how the unemployment beneﬁt exten-
sion aﬀected unemployment durations, by comparing unemployed men born in




To assess the impact of the increase in the ERA graphically, Figure 4 plots
trends in retirement, employment, unemployment, disability, partial retirement,
and not in labor force by age for men born in diﬀerent months. The vertical
lines represent the cohort-speciﬁc ERA as implemented by the 2000 and 2004
policy changes. As shown in Panel A, the fraction of retired individuals increases
by around 15 percentage points at the ERA. Approximately 10 to 15 percent
of the individuals still claim retirement beneﬁts before the ERA (but after age
60) because they have accumulated enough contribution years in order to be
exempted from the increase in the ERA.
The increase in retirement beneﬁts claiming at the ERA is accompanied by
a drop in employment and unemployment of almost 10 percentage points. How-
ever, for younger birth cohorts the declines in employment and unemployment
occur later in life due to the increase in the ERA. Panel D suggests that the
increase in the ERA had little eﬀect on disability enrollment. Similarly, the
fraction of individuals not in the labor force diﬀers only slightly across birth co-
horts, as shown in Panel F. There is evidence that some individuals responded
to the increase in the ERA by enrolling in the partial retirement scheme (Panel
E).
Figure 4
Figure 5 presents labor market trends for women born in diﬀerent months.
As shown in Panel A, the fraction of women claiming retirement beneﬁts rises
by around 30 percent at the ERA which is roughly twice as large as for men.
Panel B suggests that a signiﬁcant share of women responded to the policy
change by staying in employment as for younger birth cohorts the drop in em-
ployment occurs at a later age. Panel C shows that a sizeable share of women
17is unemployed before claiming retirement beneﬁts. Because of the increase in
the retirement age, younger birth cohorts tend to stay unemployed longer than
older birth cohorts. As for men, the increase in the ERA had virtually no eﬀect
on the probability of receiving disability beneﬁts (Panel D) or on the probability
of being out of the labor force (Panel F). Panel E shows that there is an increase
in enrollment in the partial retirement scheme for younger birth cohorts.
Figure 5
The diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence estimation strategy that uses individuals with a
long work history as comparison group assumes that, absent the increase in the
ERA, individuals with a short and long work history have comparable labor
market trends. To shed light on this assumption, Figure 6 reports retirement
trends for 60 to 61.5 year old men and 55 to 56.5 year old women by num-
ber of contribution years. As the Figure demonstrates, prior to 2001 trends
in retirement beneﬁts claiming are similar across groups, suggesting that indi-
viduals with many contribution years are a good counterfactual for those with
less contribution years. After 2001 there is a substantial drop in retirement of
around 25 percentage points among men with 35 to 45 contribution years and
of almost 50 percentage points among women with 35 to 40 contribution years.
There is no change in retirement for men with 45 contribution years or more
and women with 40 contribution years or more because these groups were not
aﬀected by the increase in the ERA. Figure 6 also shows that a sizeable share of
men and women in the treatment group still claim retirement beneﬁts in 2005
and 2006, although in these years the ERA is already 61.5 for men and 56.5 for
women. This pattern suggests that our approach to calculate the contribution
years underestimates the true number of contribution years, most likely due to
measurement error in the data.
Figure 6
185.2 Baseline Results
Using the model in equation (1), we ﬁrst explore the impact of the increase
in the ERA on retirement beneﬁts claiming, employment and non-employment
(deﬁned as not being employed or retired). In each case the dependent variable
yit is a dummy, which is equal to 1 if an individual is in the state in question
and 0 otherwise. Table 2 shows OLS estimates for our key explanatory variable
Below. Columns 1 through 4 provide results for men and columns 5 through 8
display analogous results for women.
Column 1 of Panel A indicates that the increase in the ERA reduced re-
tirement beneﬁts claiming among aﬀected men by 18.63 percentage points, or
46.5 percent of the baseline retirement rate of 60-62.25 year old men in 2000.
Column 1 of Panel B shows that this decline was accompanied by an increase
in employment of 7.33 percentage. At the same time, the share of aﬀected men
not employed increased by 11.3 percentage points, as illustrated in column 1 of
Panel C. Column 2 of Table 2 indicates that adding control variables to equa-
tion (2) has only minor eﬀect on the estimates. These estimates will be biased
if the treatment and comparison groups have diﬀerent labor supply tendencies.
To shed light on this concern, we add age-speciﬁc time trends to the baseline
speciﬁcation. The implied estimates are largely insensitive to these additional
controls, as illustrated in column 3 of Table 2. Column 4 shows estimates if we
restrict attention to men with more than 45 contribution years. Although some
coeﬃcients are signiﬁcant, the magnitude is small, suggesting that our estima-
tion strategy is not simply picking up long-run trends in diﬀerences across age
groups.
Turning to the results for women, column 5 of Panel A demonstrates that
the increase in the ERA reduced retirement beneﬁts claiming among aﬀected
women by 23.9 percentage points. This decline amounts to 50 percent of the
baseline retirement rate among 55-57.25 year old women in 2000. As shown
in column 5 of Panel C, one direct consequence of the decline in retirement
19beneﬁts claiming was an increase in employment of 10.47 percentage points.
Similarly, there is a 13.43 percentage points increase in the share of women not
employed (column 5 of Panel C). As for men, the results are very similar for the
various speciﬁcations such as adding individual characteristics (column 6) and
controlling for age-speciﬁc time trends (column 7). Column 8 presents estimates
if we restrict the sample to women with 40 contribution years or more. Some
coeﬃcients are signiﬁcant, but they are all small in size.
Table 2
The next set of results, summarized in Table 3, investigates how the increase
in the ERA aﬀected enrollment into other social insurance programs. Columns 1
through 4 report coeﬃcient estimates of our key explanatory variable Below in
equation (1) for men and the next four columns display the analogous estimates
for women. Here the dependent variable yit is a dummy, which is equal to 1 if
an individual is in the state in question and 0 otherwise.
Consistent with the graphical analysis, column 1 of Panel A shows that
registered unemployment increased by 9.49 percentage points among aﬀected
men. On the other hand, the increase in the ERA had little impact on disability
enrollment, as shown in Panel B. One possible explanation for the low disability
response is that the application process for disability beneﬁts is time consuming.
Therefore, disability enrollment varies little in the short-term. The long-term
response on disability enrollment is likely to be larger. Column 1 of Panel C
indicates that this policy change increased enrollment into the partial retirement
scheme increased by 1.14 percentage points. Also there was an increase in the
share of men not in the labor force by 0.98 percentage points, as illustrated in
column 1 of Panel D. Columns 2 and 3 show that these results are very robust
to diﬀerent speciﬁcations. Column 4 illustrates that the coeﬃcient estimates
are largely insigniﬁcant if we restrict the sample to men with 45 contribution
years or more.
20Turning to the results for women, column 5 of Panel A illustrates that, as
for men, the rise in the ERA led to a substantial increase in registered un-
employment of 9.75 percentage points and had virtually no eﬀect on disability
enrollment (column 5 of Panel B). As column 5 of Panel C demonstrates, en-
rollment in the partial retirement scheme increased by 2.43 percentage points
among aﬀected women, which is roughly twice as large as the corresponding
estimate for men. This diﬀerence could be attributed to the age diﬀerence be-
tween aﬀected women and men. This policy change also led to a small increase
the share of women who are not in the labor force, as shown in column 5 of
Panel D. Adding control variables leads to a larger estimate of the increase in
the ERA on registered unemployment (columns 6 and 7 of Panel A) and reduces
the estimated impact on enrollment into the partial retirement scheme (columns
6 and 7 of Panel C). As for men, column 8 illustrates that the estimates are
small in size and mostly insigniﬁcant if we restrict attention to women with
more than 40 contribution years.
Table 3
The eﬀects shown in Tables 2 and 3 can result either from changes in the
inﬂow into a certain state, or changes in the persistence in a certain state, or
both. To shed light on the importance of these two eﬀects, Table 4 reports
estimates from equation (1) for transitions from and persistence in employment
and unemployment. We focus on these two states because they were aﬀected
most by the increase in the ERA. Column 1 of Panel A suggests that among men
the increase in the ERA reduced direct exits from employment into retirement by
26.69 percentage points. This decline was compensated by a one to one increase
in employment persistence, as illustrated in column 2 of Panel A. On the other
hand, columns 3 to 6 of Panel A indicate that this policy change had only minor
eﬀects on transitions from employment into unemployment, disability, partial
retirement, or out of labor force. Panel B summarizes the results for transitions
21from and persistence in unemployment among men. As column 1 of Panel B
demonstrates, there is a sizeable decline in transitions from unemployment to
retirement by 79 percentage points. As in the case of employment, the decline
in retirement beneﬁts claiming was absorbed by an increase in unemployment
persistence (column 3 of Panel B), while leaving transitions to other exit states
largely unaﬀected.
The analogous estimates for women are summarized in Panels C and D of
Table 4. The estimated decline in transitions from employment to retirement
of 12.61 percentage points summarized in column 1 of Panel C is half as large
as the corresponding estimate for men. As for men, the rise in the ERA in-
creased persistence in employment by 12.27 percentage points but had no eﬀect
on transitions to other states. The estimates in Panel D illustrate that the in-
crease in the ERA reduced the probability of a transition form unemployment to




Tables 5 to 7 present estimates of the eﬀects from the increase in the ERA
for diﬀerent subgroups of individuals. Because disutility of work may increase
over age, it is instructive to examine the impact of the increase in the ERA for
diﬀerent age groups separately. OLS estimates of equation 1 for three diﬀerent
age groups are provided in Table 5. In each case the sample is restricted to the
time period over which the increase in the ERA was phased-in for the age group
of interest.
Panel A shows that this policy change was much more eﬀective in reducing
retirement beneﬁts claiming at younger ages compared to older ages. One pos-
sible explanation is that if the ERA is higher, individuals have more time to
accumulate contribution time. Thus, individuals are more likely to have suﬃ-
22cient contribution years to be exempted from the increase in the ERA. Panel B
illustrates that the rise in the ERA increased employment in all age groups, but
the magnitude is almost twice as large for the youngest age group compared to
the oldest age group. The estimates in Panel C illustrate that approximately
50 percent of the decline in retirement was compensated by an increase in regis-
tered unemployment, although in absolute terms the eﬀect is larger for younger
ages compared to older ages. The increase in the ERA for the ﬁrst and, to
some extend, the second age group was accompanied by a temporary extension
of unemployment beneﬁts from 1 to 1.5 years. The constant relative increase
in registered unemployment across age groups suggests that the temporary ex-
tension of unemployment beneﬁts had only a small impact on behavior. Panels
D to F of Table 5 consider the eﬀect of the increase in the ERA on disability
enrollment, partial retirement, and out of labor force. The estimated coeﬃcients
indicate a modest eﬀect on the share of individuals in these states.
Table 5
Previous studies have documented that health (e.g., Dwyer and Mitchell,
1999; McGarry, 2004) and previous job characteristics (e.g. Hurd and McGarry,
1993) are important determinants of the retirement decision. To examine the
importance of these factors, Table 6 reports OLS estimates of equation (1) by
health and occupational status (blue- versus white-collar). An individual is
deﬁned as healthy if he or she has not spent any time in sick leave in the past
2 years. Individuals with positive sick leave days in the past 2 years are deﬁned
as unhealthy.
Columns 1 and 2 of Panel A in Table 6 indicate that the reduction in retire-
ment after the increase in the ERA was disproportionately large among male
white-collar workers. For this group the probability of claiming retirement bene-
ﬁts decreased by 23.6 percentage points, compared to 14.4 percentage points for
male blue-collar workers. However, the pre-reform retirement rate among male
23white-collar workers is almost double that of male blue-collar workers, because
blue-collar workers are more likely to exit the labor market through the disabil-
ity insurance program. As illustrated in columns 5 and 6 of Panel A, the eﬀects
are very similar for female blue-collar and female white-collar workers, although
in relative terms the eﬀect is larger for female blue-collar workers. Interestingly,
while for men the decline in retirement is more pronounced for healthy relative
to unhealthy individuals (columns 3 and 4 of Panel A), the opposite pattern
emerges for women (columns 7 and 8 of Panel A). This diﬀerence is attributable
to a relaxation in eligibility for disability beneﬁts at age 55, which induces un-
healthy men to leave the labor force through the disability insurance program
prior to the ERA.
As Panel B demonstrates, for both men and women around one third of the
decline in retirement is compensated by an increase in employment. The eﬀect
is even larger for healthy individuals. For this group roughly half of the decline
in retirement is compensated by an increase in employment. Panel C shows
that the rise in the ERA increased registered unemployment for all subgroups.
Measured relative to the decrease in retirement, the increase in unemployment
is larger for unhealthy individuals and blue-collar workers. As Panel D demon-
strates, there is a relatively modest increase in disability enrollment after the
increase in the ERA. Speciﬁcally, depending on the subgroup disability enroll-
ment increases by 0.1 to 1.1 percentage points among men and by 0.5 to 1.8
percentage points among women. Panel E suggests that the rise in the ERA
increased participation in the partial retirement scheme except for men that are
unhealthy or have worked in blue-collar jobs. But the size of the increase is
small compared to the impact of this policy change on employment and unem-
ployment. As Panel F shows, the rise in the ERA is also associated with an
increase in the fraction of individuals not in the labor force, particularly among
white-collar workers and healthy individuals.
Table 6
24To further explore the heterogeneity in the eﬀects of the increase in the
ERA, individuals are grouped into quartiles based on their average earnings of
the best 15 years. Then we estimate equation (1) separately for each quartile
of the earnings distribution. The results of this estimation are documented in
Table 7. Panel A shows that after the increase in the ERA retirement decline
in all quartiles of the earnings distribution. The magnitude of the estimates is
larger for higher quartiles, particularly among men. For example, in the top
quartile retirement declined by 26.04 percent for men and 24.90 percent for
women, which are twice as large as the corresponding estimates for men and
women in bottom quartile. However, measured relative to the pre-reform mean
the decline in retirement is larger for individuals at the lower end of the earnings
distribution.
As Panel B demonstrates, approximately one third of the decline in retire-
ment is compensated by an increase in employment. The employment response
is slightly larger for men and women in the top quartile of the earnings dis-
tribution. Panel C shows that the rise in the ERA is also associated with
a substantial increase in registered unemployment. The estimates tend to be
larger for individuals at the top of the earnings distribution, but the diﬀerences
across quartiles are relatively small compared to the diﬀerences in the employ-
ment response. As illustrated in Panel D, we ﬁnd that the increase in the ERA
had little impact on disability enrollment, which is in line with the estimate
for the full sample reported in Table 3. Panel E indicates that enrollment in
the partial retirement scheme increased for women and men at the top of the
earnings distribution and remained almost unchanged for those at the bottom.
Panel F shows that among men in the higher earnings quartiles and among
women there was a slight increase in the share of individuals not in the labor
force.
Table 7
255.4 Further Robustness Tests
Both the 2000 and 2004 pension reforms increased the penalty for claiming re-
tirement beneﬁts before the NRA. The 2000 pension reform also temporarily
extended the unemployment beneﬁt duration from 1 to 1.5 years for certain
birth cohorts. One possible concern with the ﬁrst set of estimates is that these
changes aﬀected the labor supply behavior of younger and older individuals dif-
ferently. To shed light on this issue, Figure 6 plots the estimated coeﬃcients
of the interaction terms from equation (2), which uses men with more than 45
contribution years and women with more than 40 contribution years as compar-
ison groups. Each dot on the solid line captures the diﬀerence in the outcome
variable in the treatment group relative to the comparison group in a given year
relative to the baseline year (2000). This approach allows us to isolate the im-
pact of the increase in the ERA, because individuals in the comparison group
were also aﬀected by the other elements of the 2000 and 2004 pension reforms
with exception of the increase in the ERA. The analysis focuses on men aged
60-61.5 and women aged 55-56.5 who have at least 35 contribution years. The
age restriction allows us to observe individuals for at least 2.5 years after the
increase in the ERA took eﬀect (June 2004 - October 2006).
Figure 7
The estimates are qualitatively similar to those presented in Tables 2 and
3, but they diﬀer somewhat in size. As Figure 6 shows, the estimated coeﬃ-
cients ﬂuctuate around 0 before 2001 when the ﬁrst two-month increment of the
ERA became eﬀective. This pattern suggests that the identiﬁcation strategy is
not simply picking up pre-existing trends between the treatment and the com-
parison group. Panel A demonstrates that the fraction of 60 to 61.5 year old
men claiming retirement beneﬁts start to decline after the 2000 pension reform
becomes eﬀective. In 2005 and 2006 retirement is around 20 percentage points
below the pre-reform level, which is slightly higher than the estimated eﬀect
26for the full sample. Among 55 to 56.5 year old women there is 40 percentage
point decline in retirement after the 2001 policy change is implemented. This
estimate is around 15 percentage points higher than for the full sample, because
the full sample contains many women with insuﬃcient contribution years to be
eligible for retirement beneﬁts who are not aﬀected by the increase in the ERA.
As Panel B illustrates, around half of the decline in retirement is compen-
sated by a rise in employment. Speciﬁcally, employment increased by around
10 percentage points among men and 20 percentage points among women. Sim-
ilarly, there is an increase in registered unemployment after the increase in the
ERA of approximately 6 percentage points, which is 3 to 5 percentage points
below the estimated eﬀect for the full sample. Panel D shows that the rise in
the ERA led to more disability enrollment, particularly among men. However,
this eﬀect diminishes over time. As Panel E demonstrates, there is a substantial
increase in enrollment into the partial retirement scheme after the 2000 policy
reform becomes eﬀective with the eﬀect being approximately twice as large for
women compared to men. This pattern is consistent with the estimates shown
in Table 3, although the documented increase in partial retirement in Table 3
is smaller in magnitude. Panel F indicates that the rise in the ERA also led to
an increase in the fraction of individuals who are not in the labor force.
The extension of unemployment beneﬁts from 1 to 1.5 years was only in eﬀect
until 2002 and only certain birth cohorts were eligible. More speciﬁcally, in 2002
men born in 1942 with 15 employment years in the past 25 years could claim
beneﬁts for 1.5 years while those born in 1943 could only claim unemployment
beneﬁts for 1 year. To further explore the impact of the unemployment beneﬁts
extension, we can therefore compare job seekers in 2002 who are born in 1942
with those who are born in 1943 using a regression discontinuity design. We
can use an analogous approach for women, because in 2002 women born in 1947
with 15 employment years in the past 25 years were eligible for the extended
beneﬁts while those born in 1948 were not.
27Table 8 displays the coeﬃcients (with robust standard errors in parentheses)
form regressing the unemployment duration on a dummy for being eligible for
the beneﬁt extension. Columns (1) to (3) provide results for men and the
next three columns display the analogous results for women. The estimates
in columns (1) and (4) include a linear birth cohort trend and a linear birth
cohort trend interacted with a dummy for being eligible for the beneﬁt extension.
Columns (2) and (5) add quadratic birth cohort trends and columns (3) and (6)
add cubic birth cohort trends (always interacted with a dummy for being eligible
for the beneﬁt extension). The coeﬃcients are insigniﬁcant in all speciﬁcations,
suggesting that the extended beneﬁts did not aﬀect the unemployment duration.
Table 8
6 Conclusion
Relying on two policy changes in Austria, this paper analyzed the impact of
an increase in the ERA on the labor supply of older workers. Austria is char-
acterized by an extremely low labor force participation rate of older workers
as compared to other industrialized countries. Only 42 percent of men and 29
percent of women aged 55-64 are employed or actively seeking for work. With
the goal of fostering employment and improving the ﬁscal health of the public
pension system, in 2000 and 2004 the Austrian government implemented a series
of changes to the public pension system. The most signiﬁcant change brought
about by this legislation was a gradual increase in the retirement age from 55
to 57.2 for women and from 60 to 62.2 for men.
Using data on the universe of Austrian private-sector workers, the empiri-
cal analysis suggests that an increase in the ERA has a signiﬁcant impact on
employment. Speciﬁcally, employment increased by 7 percentage points among
aﬀected men and by 10 percentage points among aﬀected women. The empir-
ical analysis also suggests that an increase in the ERA may aﬀect enrollment
28in other government programs which provide income replacement in the event
of separation from the labor market for economic or health reasons. In this
case, the share of individuals receiving unemployment beneﬁts increased by 10
percentage points among men and by 11 percentage points among women.
The public pension programs are large and growing in most industrialized
countries. Understanding how changes in the program parameters aﬀect labor
supply is extremely important for policy makers. One way to control the size
and growth of public pension programs is through an increase in the ERA.
The estimates presented in this paper suggest that this measure is eﬀective in
increasing employment, despite large absorption eﬀects by the unemployment
insurance. The Austrian labor market is characterized by relatively high unem-
ployment rate of older workers. Thus, the large increase in the unemployment
rate may reﬂect unfavorable labor market conditions of older workers. In a more
ﬂexible labor market, such as in the U.S. for example, increasing the ERA is
likely to have a smaller impact on unemployment.
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Figure 1: Percentage of men and women working by age in 2000 and 2006.
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Figure 2: Increase in the minimum retirement age by gender.
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Figure 3: Percentage of men aged 60-62.17 and women aged 55-57.17 claiming
retirement beneﬁts by year.
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Figure 6: Percentage of men aged 60-61.5 and women aged 60-61.5 claiming
retirement beneﬁts by year and work experience.















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































39Table 1: Sample statistics for men aged 60-62.25 and women aged 55-57.25 by
year
Men Women
2000 2002 2004 2006 2000 2002 2004 2006
A. Labor market states (%)
Retirement 40.1 32.7 26.2 25.3 48.0 30.9 21.9 15.0
Employment 6.7 10.2 14.3 17.4 29.2 38.9 41.8 47.9
Unemployment 0.8 3.8 6.8 7.9 4.3 9.5 10.9 10.9
Disability 51.4 50.9 46.9 41.0 13.1 12.3 12.5 11.7
Partial retirement 0.0 0.5 3.0 4.8 0.0 1.8 6.0 7.1
Not in labor force 1.1 1.8 2.8 3.7 5.4 6.6 7.0 7.4
B. Background characteristics
Blue collar 0.563 0.542 0.537 0.559 0.405 0.427 0.437 0.455
Sick days 6.1 6.3 7.5 7.4 13.4 15.5 14.3 12.8
Experience 19.3 19.1 19.1 19.1 17.8 17.6 17.8 17.8
Insurance years 38.5 38.8 38.8 38.7 29.7 29.5 29.8 29.7
Annual earnings 30,222 30,914 31,113 31,327 21,233 20,855 21,210 21,594
Average earnings 30,514 31,521 32,179 32,478 20,893 20,872 21,265 21,593
Number of 241,941 263,173 223,827 192,017 219,914 207,436 251,873 240,652
observations
Notes: “Experience” denotes experience in the last 25 years, “sick days” is the sum of days
spent in sick leave in the last 2 years, and “average earnings” is the average annual earnings
over the best 15 years. Annual earnings and average earnings are adjusted for inﬂation.
40Table 2: Eﬀects on retirement, employment, and non-employment
Men Women
No With Age  time At least No With Age  time At least
controls controls trends 45 CY controls controls trends 40 CY
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
A. Retired
Below -18.63*** -18.40*** -18.45*** -1.68*** -23.90*** -22.40*** -22.57*** -1.95**
(0.20) (0.16) (0.17) (0.54) (0.20) (0.17) (0.18) (0.77)
R2 0.061 0.319 0.319 0.305 0.165 0.372 0.372 0.329
Mean 40.08 40.08 40.08 82.67 48.04 48.04 48.04 78.48
B. Employed
Below 7.33*** 6.16*** 6.33*** 1.35*** 10.47*** 8.79*** 8.60*** 1.09
(0.13) (0.11) (0.12) (0.52) (0.19) (0.15) (0.17) (0.76)
R2 0.046 0.194 0.194 0.342 0.054 0.223 0.223 0.316
Mean 6.73 6.73 6.73 14.96 29.16 29.16 29.16 20.48
C. Not employed
Below 11.30*** 12.24*** 12.12*** 0.33 13.43*** 13.61*** 13.97*** 0.87***
(0.19) (0.14) (0.16) (0.21) (0.19) (0.16) (0.18) (0.24)
R2 0.010 0.385 0.385 0.041 0.026 0.213 0.213 0.043
Mean 53.19 53.19 53.19 2.37 22.80 22.80 22.80 1.03
Obs. 1,646,691 1,646,691 1,646,691 91,851 1,604,993 1,604,993 1,604,993 53,281
Notes: This Table displays coeﬃcients from a linear probability model. Standard errors, in
parentheses, are clustered at the individual level. Coeﬃcient estimates and standard errors
are multiplied by 100 and should be interpreted as percentage points. Controls are experience
and its square, blue-collar status, insurance years, annual earnings, average earnings over the
best 15 years, number of sick leave days in the last 2 years, industry, region and month-of-
birth. Annual earnings and average earnings are adjusted for inﬂation. The time period is
2000-2006. Reported means are for men aged 60-62.25 and women aged 55-57.25 in 2000.
Signiﬁcance levels: *** = 1%, ** = 5%, * = 10%.
41Table 3: Eﬀects on unemployment, disability, part-tim work, and not in the
labor force
Men Women
No With Age  time At least No With Age  time At least
controls controls trends 45 CY controls controls trends 40 CY
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
A. Unemployed
Below 9.48*** 9.84*** 9.92*** 0.04 9.75*** 10.83*** 11.13*** 0.12*
(0.11) (0.11) (0.12) (0.03) (0.13) (0.13) (0.14) (0.06)
R2 0.044 0.105 0.105 0.002 0.022 0.120 0.120 0.005
Mean 0.77 0.77 0.77 0.01 4.27 4.27 4.27 0.03
B. Disabled
Below -0.30* 0.82*** 0.64*** -0.08 0.39*** 0.48*** 0.66*** -0.05
(0.16) (0.09) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.08) (0.09) (0.08)
R2 0.006 0.378 0.378 0.034 0.001 0.089 0.089 0.006
Mean 51.35 51.35 51.35 1.16 13.12 13.12 13.12 0.19
C. Partial retirement
Below 1.14*** 0.77*** 0.83*** 0.39*** 2.43*** 1.51*** 1.48*** 0.93***
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.09) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.17)
R2 0.029 0.066 0.066 0.104 0.031 0.081 0.081 0.055
Mean 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03
D. Not in labor force
Below 0.98*** 0.81*** 0.72*** -0.03 0.87*** 0.79*** 0.70*** -0.13
(0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.15) (0.09) (0.07) (0.07) (0.15)
R2 0.006 0.038 0.038 0.019 0.001 0.255 0.255 0.031
Mean 40.08 40.08 40.08 82.67 5.37 5.37 5.37 0.78
Obs. 1,646,691 1,646,691 1,646,691 91,851 1,604,993 1,604,993 1,604,993 53,281
Notes: This Table displays coeﬃcients from a linear proability model. Standard errors in
parentheses are clustered at the individual level. Coeﬃcient estimates and standard errors are
multiplied by 100 and should be interpreted as percentage points. Controls are experience and
its square, blue-collar status, insurance years, annual earnings, average earnings over the best
15 years, number of sick leave days in the last 2 years, industry, region and month-of-birth.
Annual earnings and average earnings are adjusted for inﬂation. The time period is 2000-2006.
Reported means are for men aged 60-62.25 and women aged 55-57.25 in 2000. Signiﬁcance
levels: *** = 1%, ** = 5%, * = 10%.
42Table 4: Eﬀect on transitions from employment and unemployment by gender
Transition to: Retired Employed Unemployed Disabled Partial Not in
retirement labor force
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Men
A. Employed
Below -26.69*** 26.05*** 1.75*** 0.21** 0.09** -1.41***
(0.40) (0.43) (0.14) (0.08) (0.04) (0.13)
R2 0.116 0.099 0.055 0.035 0.005 0.009
Obs. 176,441
B. Unemployed
Below -79.90*** 1.03*** 78.68*** 0.06 0.01 0.12
(0.55) (0.22) (0.59) (0.13) (0.01) (0.13)




Below -12.61*** 12.27*** 0.80*** 0.02 -0.02 -0.45***
(0.16) (0.19) (0.09) (0.04) (0.04) (0.06)
R2 0.084 0.071 0.046 0.023 0.005 0.013
Obs. 565,728
D. Unemployed
Below -52.80*** 0.34* 51.79*** 0.32*** -0.01 0.36***
(0.41) (0.20) (0.47) (0.11) (0.01) (0.13)
R2 0.348 0.094 0.186 0.024 0.001 0.016
Obs. 130,990
Notes: This Table reports coeﬃcients from a linear probability model. Standard errors in
parentheses are clustered at the individual level. Coeﬃcient estimates and standard errors
are multiplied by 100 and should be interpreted as percentage points. All estimates control
for experience and its square, blue-collar status, insurance years, annual earnings, average
earnings over the best 15 years, number of sick leave days in the last 2 years, industry, region,
month-of-birth and cohort-speciﬁc time trends. Annual earnings and average earnings are
adjusted for inﬂation. The time period is 2000-2006. Signiﬁcance levels: *** = 1%, ** = 5%,
* = 10%.
43Table 5: Estimates for diﬀerent periods
Men Women
 ERA: 60 to 60.67 60.75 to 61.5 61.58 to 62.17 55 to 55.67 55.75 to 56.5 56.58 to 57.17
Ages: 60-60.75 60.75-61.58 61.58-62.25 55-55.75 55.75-56.5 56.5-57.25
Quarters: Jan 00-Jul 02 Jul 02-Jul 04 Apr 04-Oct 06 Jan 00-Jul 02 Jul 02-Jul 04 Jul 04-Oct 06
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
A. Retired
Below -21.39*** -18.46*** -12.18*** -23.61*** -24.09*** -13.65***
(0.35) (0.36) (0.34) (0.39) (0.35) (0.31)
R2 0.314 0.312 0.330 0.353 0.340 0.361
Mean 37.86 41.77 41.52 40.93 49.44 54.07
B. Employed
Below 7.60*** 7.44*** 4.26*** 9.28*** 8.32*** 5.55***
(0.30) (0.29) (0.24) (0.45) (0.38) (0.34)
R2 0.213 0.216 0.192 0.224 0.206 0.212
Mean 9.03 5.62 4.34 35.95 27.87 23.35
C. Unemployed
Below 12.20*** 9.84*** 7.12*** 13.68*** 12.69*** 6.72***
(0.26) (0.25) (0.21) (0.38) (0.31) (0.25)
R2 0.104 0.100 0.102 0.106 0.125 0.140
Mean 0.86 0.73 0.67 5.16 4.23 3.37
D. Disabled
Below 0.99*** 0.59* 0.33 0.20 -0.10 -0.09
(0.30) (0.32) (0.30) (0.27) (0.24) (0.24)
R2 0.390 0.376 0.377 0.075 0.086 0.104
Mean 50.88 51.04 52.67 12.09 13.21 14.17
E. Partial retirement
Below 0.08 1.66*** 0.65*** 0.10 2.75*** 1.08***
(0.06) (0.12) (0.07) (0.11) (0.17) (0.13)
R2 0.019 0.043 0.018 0.034 0.062 0.042
Mean 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.03 0.03
F. Not in labor force
Below 0.61*** 0.59*** 0.46*** 0.35 0.42** 0.38**
(0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.22) (0.18) (0.18)
R2 0.035 0.034 0.033 0.252 0.268 0.268
Mean 1.37 0.85 0.80 5.84 5.22 5.02
Obs. 266,712 209,914 175,360 202,639 213,471 200,366
Notes: This Table displays coeﬃcients from a linear probability model. Standard errors in
parentheses are clustered at the individual level. Coeﬃcient estimates and standard errors are
multiplied by 100 and should be interpreted as percentage points. All estimates control for
experience and its square, insurance years, annual earnings, average earnings over the best 15
years, industry, region, month-of-birth, and cohort-speciﬁc time trends. Reported means are
for the year 2000. Signiﬁcance levels: *** = 1%, ** = 5%, * = 10%.
44Table 6: Estimates for subsamples: skill and health
Men Women
Blue- White- Unhealthy Healthy Blue- White- Unhealthy Healthy
collar collar collar collar
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
A. Retired
Below -14.39*** -23.24*** -15.13*** -24.67*** -21.05*** -23.72*** -24.94*** -19.70***
(0.21) (0.28) (0.20) (0.33) (0.26) (0.25) (0.25) (0.27)
R2 0.300 0.291 0.314 0.269 0.346 0.379 0.367 0.386
Mean 28.63 54.86 29.36 59.79 40.21 53.40 47.46 48.64
B. Employed
Below 4.86*** 8.03*** 4.47*** 9.92*** 7.62*** 9.35*** 8.66*** 8.89***
(0.15) (0.21) (0.13) (0.26) (0.25) (0.23) (0.22) (0.26)
R2 0.145 0.236 0.138 0.237 0.239 0.221 0.199 0.227
Mean 3.45 10.96 2.83 13.88 28.39 29.69 22.45 36.09
C. Unemployed
Below 8.71*** 11.33*** 9.37*** 10.86*** 11.17*** 11.09*** 13.76*** 7.55***
(0.16) (0.18) (0.14) (0.21) (0.22) (0.18) (0.21) (0.18)
R2 0.111 0.105 0.101 0.097 0.127 0.108 0.097 0.055
Mean 0.95 0.54 0.74 0.83 5.57 3.38 4.71 3.81
D. Disabled
Below 0.50*** 0.86*** 0.65*** 0.57*** 1.09*** 0.33*** 0.81*** 0.42***
(0.15) (0.15) (0.14) (0.17) (0.15) (0.11) (0.14) (0.10)
R2 0.294 0.355 0.336 0.210 0.088 0.087 0.116 0.028
Mean 66.14 32.27 66.38 23.74 18.06 9.75 20.33 5.69
E. Partial retirement
Below 0.25*** 1.52*** 0.36*** 1.72*** 0.64*** 2.11*** 1.06*** 2.03***
(0.05) (0.10) (0.05) (0.13) (0.09) (0.11) (0.09) (0.13)
R2 0.045 0.085 0.053 0.087 0.064 0.091 0.076 0.088
Mean 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.05 0.03 0.04
F. Not in labor force
Below 0.07 1.50*** 0.28*** 1.61*** 0.53*** 0.83*** 0.65*** 0.80***
(0.06) (0.10) (0.06) (0.12) (0.12) (0.09) (0.10) (0.11)
R2 0.021 0.084 0.017 0.106 0.271 0.233 0.197 0.333
Mean 0.83 1.36 0.69 1.75 7.76 3.74 5.02 5.73
Obs. 900,070 746,621 1,082,522 564,169 696,030 908,963 877,277 727,716
Notes: This Table reports coeﬃcients from a linear probability model. Standard errors in
parentheses are clustered at the individual level. Coeﬃcient estimates and standard errors
are multiplied by 100 and should be interpreted as percentage points. All estimates control
for experience and its square, insurance years, annual earnings, average earnings over the best
15 years, industry, region, month-of-birth, and cohort-speciﬁc time trends. Speciﬁcations (1),
(2), (5), and (6) also control for the number of sick leave days in the last 2 years. Speciﬁcation
(3), (4), (7), and (8) also control for blue-collar status. Annual earnings and average earnings
are adjusted for inﬂation. The time period is 2000-2006. Reported means are for the year
2000. Signiﬁcance levels: *** = 1%, ** = 5%, * = 10%.
45Table 7: Estimates by quartiles of life-time earnings
Men Women
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 1st 2nd 3rd 4th
quartile quartile quartile quartile quartile quartile quartile quartile
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
A. Retired
Below -12.60*** -15.18*** -19.82*** -26.04*** -13.41*** -22.39*** -26.11*** -24.90***
(0.28) (0.32) (0.35) (0.39) (0.27) (0.34) (0.36) (0.37)
R2 0.212 0.309 0.346 0.260 0.314 0.369 0.379 0.360
Mean 19.53 32.78 42.91 65.08 28.45 45.72 55.33 62.64
B. Employed
Below 3.62*** 5.59*** 5.79*** 10.16*** 5.11*** 7.61*** 10.80*** 10.21***
(0.21) (0.22) (0.23) (0.31) (0.29) (0.31) (0.32) (0.32)
R2 0.150 0.161 0.174 0.294 0.235 0.239 0.242 0.236
Mean 5.27 3.37 3.60 14.66 31.84 28.28 28.33 28.20
C. Unemployed
Below 8.04*** 8.55*** 12.25*** 10.80*** 6.81*** 12.75*** 12.36*** 9.96***
(0.24) (0.22) (0.25) (0.23) (0.26) (0.29) (0.26) (0.23)
R2 0.110 0.098 0.145 0.090 0.106 0.117 0.126 0.119
Mean 2.05 0.58 0.23 0.23 7.27 5.46 3.13 1.24
D. Disabled
Below 0.69*** 0.58*** 0.67*** 0.64*** 0.49*** 0.64*** 0.32** 0.37***
(0.24) (0.22) (0.22) (0.18) (0.19) (0.18) (0.16) (0.12)
R2 0.197 0.352 0.396 0.291 0.065 0.084 0.097 0.108
Mean 71.24 62.44 52.57 19.20 18.95 16.01 10.79 6.75
E. Partial retirement
Treated 0.23*** 0.44*** 0.47*** 2.18*** 0.08** 0.61*** 2.08*** 3.55***
(0.05) (0.08) (0.10) (0.16) (0.04) (0.10) (0.16) (0.19)
R2 0.024 0.048 0.068 0.104 0.014 0.045 0.084 0.113
Mean 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.03 0.05 0.04
F. Not in labor force
Treated 0.02 0.03 0.63*** 2.27*** 0.91*** 0.79*** 0.56*** 0.80***
(0.10) (0.09) (0.10) (0.15) (0.18) (0.13) (0.10) (0.11)
R2 0.061 0.058 0.046 0.048 0.278 0.206 0.173 0.072
Mean 1.91 0.82 0.69 0.82 13.48 4.51 2.37 1.14
Obs. 411,604 411,741 411,662 411,684 401,199 401,281 401,249 401,264
Notes: This Table reports coeﬃcients from a linear probability model. Standard errors in
parentheses are clustered at the individual level. Coeﬃcient estimates and standard errors
are multiplied by 100 and should be interpreted as percentage points. All estimates control
for experience and its square, blue-collar status, insurance years, annual earnings, average
earnings over the best 15 years, number of sick leave days in the last 2 years, industry, region,
month-of-birth and cohort-speciﬁc time trends. Annual earnings and average earnings are
adjusted for inﬂation. The time period is 2000-2006. Reported means are for the year 2000.
Signiﬁcance levels: *** = 1%, ** = 5%, * = 10%.
46Table 8: The eﬀect of extended beneﬁt duration on unemployment durations
Men Women
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Treatment eﬀect 62.55 119.67 62.33 30.18 -27.37 -38.25
(64.74) (76.30) (99.50) (38.74) (58.59) (56.61)
Linear cohort trends Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Quadratic cohort trends Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cubic cohort trends Yes Yes
Obs. 5,336 5,336 5,336 6,368 6,368 6,368
R2 0.007 0.007 0.008 0.002 0.002 0.003
Notes: This Table displays the coeﬃcients from regressing unemployment duration on a
dummy for being born before 1/1/1943 (men) or 1/1/1948 (women). The male sample in-
cludes all men born in 1942 or 1943 who were unemployed on 1/1/2002 or started a new
unemployment spell in 2002. The female sample includes all women born in 1947 or 1948
who were unemployed on 1/1/2002 or started a new unemployment spell in 2002. Signiﬁcance
levels: *** = 1%, ** = 5%, * = 10%.
47